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ABSTRACT 
Greater levels of complexity in tunnelling with Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) allow higher chances of fail-
ures that may increase the potential hazardous risks. This paper presents the results of a study on TBM 
reliability using risk analysis. Machinery Failure Mode and Effect analysis was applied to analyze the risks 
of a TBM using QS9000 and SAE.J1739 recommendations. For this purpose, 48 failure modes were pos-
tulated for the TBM main systems and all subsystems. Afterwards, the effects of every failure were listed. 
Safeguards or controls that might prevent or mitigate the effects of each failure were also listed. In the 
final step, essential remedial actions to prevent or mitigate the failure were recommended. Risk Matrix 
was developed for each possible failure to be used for risk ranking. For this, the Risk Priority Number 
(RPN) was estimated for each failure mode for pro and post application of control measures to identify the 
most critical failures. The results revealed that 7 failure modes had risk priority numbers higher than 80 
therefore, they were categorized unacceptable. Cutter head stop due to bad rock condition with RPN=240 
was the significant critical failure. The results also showed that 3 failure modes in TBM required modifica-
tion due to high Severity rate. The findings from this study were applied to a long tunnel under construc-
tion and significantly reduced the accidents during the next two years tunnelling period. It can be con-
cluded that MFMEA is a superb tool for TBM reliability evaluation and promotion. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Failures during tunnel and mine excavation may lead 
to serious human, property and investment losses. Risk 
management is therefore, essential in these projects [ 1, 
 2.  
Accidents in tunnel, mine and underground space 
works may lead to catastrophe, if they are not precisely 
predicted and effectively controlled in advance. In 1949 
in north-east China, 1,549 miners lost their life in one 
accident. During 2004, in China 6,300 miners were 
killed in accidents. In 2003 in the BobNizo mine located 
in south east Iran, 9 miners were killed in an explosion 
incident. In 2006 in a tunnel excavation in west Iran, 4 
people died from deadly Hydrogen Disulfide (H2S) gas 
emission when the ventilation system failed. In the work 
of a dam project in the south of Iran started in 2005, 22 
workers died in 2 years in different accidents [ 3]. In 
2009, 12 miners lost their life in a mine accident, in 
south east Iran. Other countries experience similar ever 
increasing awareness of hazardous risks that need to be 
managed. This includes Hazard Identification, Risk As-
sessment and Risk Management [ 3- 5].  
Many of the hazards may be identified by conduct-
ing a PHA (Process Hazard Analysis), such as HAZOP 
(Hazard and Operability Analysis), What If/Checklist or 
FMEA. At the identification stage there is no clear or 
concise picture of what this danger might be or how 
often it might occur. At this stage it may be felt that the 
use of a risk matrix of severity versus likelihood pro-
vides an adequate pseudo-measure or approximate 
gauging of risk so that a full quantification of the risk 
would not be necessary.  
FMEA is a widely used methodology to identify 
hazards [ 5]. It is used to analyze specific systems or 
items of equipment that are best handled as objects 
rather than by the use of parameters or operations [ 4]. 
FMEA is also used for analyzing items of equipment 
having interactive mechanical and/or electrical compo-
nents. Many authors, including, Hyatt believe that 
FMEA is very good for analyzing complex equipment 
items where the failure of a component may have a  ma- 
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jor consequences. Some authors believe that FMEA 
does not relate to specific failures that have common 
causes. In such cases, it needs to be used with Fault 
Tree Analysis to broaden the scope.  
Different standards including MIL STD1629A, SAE 
ARP 5580 and SAE J1739 describe the methodology for 
applying FMEA [ 3,  6,  7]. Some institutions have it as a 
part of their mandate along with other PHAs. 
There are six types of FMEA namely machinery-
FMEA, design-FMEA, system-FMEA, process-FMEA, 
application-FMEA, and product-FMEA. The nature of 
the study and the stage of the process life cycle when it 
is conducted, determines the type of FMEA to be used. 
Each FMEA follows the same approach. The nature, 
purpose and scope of the study dictate which type of 
FMEA and to what extent of detail is used. 
In order to modify the safety of operator, reliability 
and operability of machinery systems such as present 
study, MFMEA (Machinery FMEA) is a standard tech-
nique for equipment failures assessment. MFMEA is 
specifically invented for machinery hazard identifica-
tion. Unlike other methods it uses 3 parameters of sever-
ity, detection and likelihood of each hazard which is its 
main advantage over other hazard identification meth-
ods. This technique fits well with the objectives of the 
present study to assess the reliability of the tunnel bor-
ing machine.  
From 1993 to 2005, In Iran, many researchers, in-
cluding, Pourparand, Kakavandi, Ali Mohammadi, Azar 
Barzine, and Naderi applied FMEA to assess safety 
status of different manufacturing processes [ 3]. In all of 
these studies Risk Matrix was used for risk ranking. For 
this purpose RPN was estimated to identify the most 
critical failures. None of these studies applied to tunnel-
ling.  
In other countries different studies, including [ 8- 17] 
used FMEA to analyze the safety of different processes. 
None of these processes included tunnelling. In most of 
these studies RPN was calculated and then the safety 
status was assessed. In 2004 Working Group 2 of the 
International Tunnel Association issued guidelines for 
tunnelling risk assessment [ 1]. These guidelines are 
considered for the risks integrated with other systems 
and are useful for both consultants and contractors. 
The Tehran–North freeway is one of the largest road 
projects in Iran. Many tunnels, including the longest 
national road tunnel are under construction in this pro-
ject. This tunnel, called Alborz, is located at 2,400 m 
higher than sea level and is 6,350 m in length with 
maximum 850 m of over burden. The tunnel consists of 
3 bores, two main tunnels with a pilot tunnel between 
them. The  pilot tunnel is under  excavation using  TBM  
Table 1. Likelihood ranking used in the present study (QS9000)
Rank Failure Occurrence Failure Rate 
10 Very High, failure almost certain. MTBF≤1 hr 
9 Very high number of failures likely. 2 hr<MTBF≤10 hr 
8 High number of failures likely.  11 hr<MTBF≤100 hr 
7 Moderately high number of failures likely.  101 hr<MTBF≤400 hr 
6 Medium number of failures likely. 401 hr<MTBF≤1000 hr 
5 Occasional failures likely. 1001 hr<MTBF≤2000 hr 
4 Few failures likely. 2001 hr<MTBF≤3000 hr 
3 Very few failures likely. 3001 hr<MTBF≤6000 hr 
2 Rare number of failures likely. 6001 hr<MTBF≤10000 hr 
1 Failure highly unlikely. MTBF>10000 hr 
 
to gather geotechnical data for the main tunnel design. 
The pilot tunnel will be used as a service tunnel during 
the tunnel operation.  
Pro-excavation geological data showed that gas 
emission and water flow was expected in the tunnel. 
Methane (CH4) and Hydrogen Disulfide (H2S) emis-
sions in very high concentrations were recorded before 
applying this risk analysis. TBM stop due to bad rock 
condition was also expected. The TBM used in this pro-
ject was not originally designed for such a hard condi-
tion. Therefore, MFMEA was applied to assess the reli-
ability of the TBM used in the Alborz Tunnel. 
METHODS 
Machinery Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(MFMEA) were applied to identify failures, evaluate the 
effects of the failures and prioritize the failures of a 
TBM. For application of MFMEA, pertinent informa-
tion e.g. site plans, charts, operations information, pro-
cedures, relevant data, and design plan were collected. 
In the next step the purpose, scope, depth of the study, 
associated costs, expertise, experience available and so 
on were established. The TBM was broken into 4 main 
systems including mechanic, hydraulic, pneumatic and 
electric systems.  
All potential failure modes for each system were 
identified. The causes of each failure mode were deter-
mined. All current controls were identified and listed. A 
rating for severity, occurrence and detection of each 
failure was assigned. All correction actions were deter-
mined. In the final step, the recommendations were car-
ried out.  
Risk Matrix was used for prioritizing of the risks. 
Risk Matrix was developed using severity, likelihood 
and detection parameters. Risk Priority Number (RPN) 
was determined using these parameters. The MTBF 
(Mean Time between Failures) was used for likelihood 
ranking (Table 1)[ 4,  6].  
The severity parameter was ranked according to 
QS9000 and SAE.J1739 recommendations (Table 2). 
Risks were categorized using Risk Priority Number. 
RPN was calculated using the following equation. 
 ( )1NumDetNumLikNumSevRPN ××=  
Risk Matrix was developed using likelihood and se-
verity parameters. The Risk Ranking was categorized 
according to the RPN calculated for each failure.  
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Table 2. Severity Ranking used in the present study (QS9000 & SAE.J1739)
The detection was ranked using QS 9000 & SAE 
J1739 recommendations (Table 3). 
Rank Effect Measure: Severity Effect 
10 Maximum Severity Injury or harm to operating personnel. Failure resulting in hazardous effects almost certain. Non-compliance with government regulations. 
9 Extreme Severity Failure resulting in hazardous effects highly probable. Safety and regulatory concerns. 
8 Very High Severity Significant downtime and major financial impacts. Product inoperable but safe. User very dissatis-fied, e.g. TBM stops for longer than 30 days 
7 High Severity Significant downtime. Product performance severely affected. User very dissatisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 10 -30 days 
6 Severe Disruption to downstream process. Product operable and safe but performance degraded. User dis-satisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 24 hr -10 days. 
5 Moderate Impacts will be noticeable throughout operations. Reduced performance with gradual performance degradation. User dissatisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 10 to 24 hr 
4 Minor Local and/or downstream process might be affected. User will experience minor negative impact on the product. e.g. TBM stops for 1 to 10 hr. 
3 Slight User will probably notice the effect but the effect is slight e.g. TBM stops for less than 1 hr. 
2 Very Slight No downstream effect. Insignificant / negligible effect. e.g. parameter variation is in control range, adjustments or controls are essential. 
1 
None Might be noticeable by the operator. Improbable/not noticeable by the user e.g. parameter variation 
is in control range, adjustments or controls are not essential or it can be checked during mainte-
nance shift. 
  
 
Different measures were considered to decide 
whether it is necessary to intervene for modification or 
prevention of failures. Review of failure characteristics 
including critical condition, controlling possibilities, 
safety or severity and an acceptable RPN was consid-
ered as a measure of decision making for modification 
or prevention of failures. 
Acceptable RPN varies from a plant to plant. Naderi 
considered it to be 100 for analysis of a lift. The number 
was obtained from multiplying 4×5×5. Ulrich Hussels 
used the RPN of 108 as an acceptable level in a vehicle 
cooling system analysis. This number was obtained 
from 3×4×9 [ 3]. According to engineering decisions, 
regulatory restrictions, safety standards, financial status 
of the organization and etc, an acceptable RPN of 80 
was determined in the present study. The acceptable 
RPN was based on multiplying 5×4×4 = 80. Failure 
modes with higher RPN were categorized critical fail-
ures then. 
RESULTS  
A total number of 48 potential failure modes were 
identified and studied for all 4 main systems (Table 4). 
For each system and subsystem a tabular form similar to 
Table (A) in the appendix was completed. The modifi-
cation and control actions applicable to reduce the RPN 
of each failure recommended by the related expertise 
team with its effect on final RPN were also listed. The 
severity, likelihood and detection rating for each failure 
at existing condition and after recommended control 
actions taken were estimated. Risk Priority Number of 
each failure mode was then calculated. 
Table 3. Detection Ranking used in the present study (QS9000 & SAE.J1739)
Rank Effect Measure: Severity Effect 
10 Extremely Unlikely Controls will almost certainly not detect the existence of a defect, or there are no con-trols on the equipment. 
9 Remote Likelihood Controls have a very low probability of detecting existence of a defect. 
8 Very Low Likelihood Has lowest effectiveness in each applicable category. 
7 Low Likelihood Has low effectiveness for detection. 
6 Moderately Low Likelihood Has moderately low effectiveness for detection. 
5 Medium Likelihood Has medium effectiveness for detection 
4 Moderately High Likelihood Has moderately high effectiveness for detection. 
3 High Likelihood Has high effectiveness for detection. 
2 Very High Likelihood Controls have very high probability of detecting existence of failure.  
1 Extremely Likely Controls will almost certainly detect the existence of the defect. 
   
Electric system. Sixteen failures were identified in 
electric part of TBM (Table 5). No voltage and low 
voltage failures at the transformer with risk priority 
numbers of 9 and 90 had the minimum and maximum 
risks in electric system respectively. The high standard 
deviation of 21.4 in comparison with the low average 
risk priority number of 36 represented a scattered RPN 
in TBM electric system. 
The results revealed that the low output voltage at 
the transformers was the only unacceptable failure in 
TBM electric system (Fig. 1). 
According to Fig. 2, three failures of High voltage 
supplied by the generators, high voltage leakage from 
transformers and missing dynamo layers of transformers 
need to be redesigned mainly due to their high severity 
rate of more than five.  
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Table 4. Studied TBM systems and subsystems 
System Code Subsystem Code Component Code 
 
Electric System 
 
1 
Generator 
Transformer 
Control Board 
Power Board 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
  
 
Hydraulic System 
 
2 
Reservoir 
Piping 
Pump 
Feeding Pump 
Oil Cooler 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
  
 
Pneumatic System 
 
3 
Compressor 
Electromotor 
Air Tank 
Air Screw Pump 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
Filter 
Outlet Valve 
Relief Valve 
3.1.1 
3.1.2 
3.3.1 
Mechanical System  4 
Grab 
Cutter Head 
Conveyor 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
  
  
 
   
Table 5. Risk Priority Numbers of TBM Systems 
Existing Condition After Control Failure Mode Elec Hydr Pneu Mech Elec Hydr Pneu Mech 
Min 9 12 16 48 6 8 3 24 
Max 90 96 108 240 60 40 54 120 
Average 36 34.4 43.9 100.8 16.5 14.7 17.1 49.7 
Standard Dev 21.4 23.6 24.8 68.2 14.2 12.8 14.6 37.0 
N 16 10 14 8 16 10 14 8 
 
Hydraulic System. A total number of 10 potential 
failure modes were identified and studied in TBM hy-
draulic system (Table 5). According to this table, mini-
mum, maximum and average risk priority numbers of 
all failures in hydraulic system are very similar to those 
obtained for electric system. The failures of leakage 
from piping and starting in hydraulic pumps had the 
minimum and maximum risk priority numbers respec-
tively.  
According to Fig. 1, the failure of pressure supplier 
to start (RPN=96) was the only unacceptable failure in 
TBM hydraulic system. Fig. 2 shows that none of the 
failures in hydraulic system require redesigning. 
Pneumatic System. As it is shown in Table 5, a to-
tal number of 14 failures were identified and studied in 
pneumatic system. The results revealed that, defective 
opening of high pressure tank has the maximum RPN 
(e.g. 108) while the shorting coil in electromotor with a 
RPN of 16 has the lowest risk. 
According to Fig. 1, failing of the air tank relief 
valve to open, with a RPN of 108 is the only unaccept-
able failure. Fig. 2 shows that 3 failures of compressor 
electric coil breakdown, failing of the compressor to 
start, and failing of the air tank relief valve to open need 
to be redesigned mainly due to their high severity rates.  
Mechanical System. Eight failure modes were 
identified in TBM mechanical system. Table 5 shows 
the maximum, minimum, average and the standard de-
viation of Risk Priority Numbers of failures in mechani-
cal system. 
The results showed that cutter head stop had the 
highest RPN. Two failures of Grab inlet tap breakdown 
and Electric tap breakdown have the minimum Risk 
Priority Number.  
 According to Fig. 1, 4 failures in TBM mechanical 
system have unacceptable Risk Priority Numbers (e.g. 
RPN>80), which need to be modified. According to Fig. 
2, three parts need to be redesigned mainly due to high 
severity rates of their failures.  
DISCUSSION 
Addressing the modification and controlling meth-
ods of the failures and quantification of their influences 
on the final risk priority number of each failure by the 
expertise team was the novelty of the present study.  
Seven failure modes with RPN>80 were categorized 
unacceptable failures. Fig. 1 shows these failure modes 
with their codes. The results show that even after modi-
fication and applying control measures, the cutter head 
stop failure mode will still have a RPN of higher than 
80.  
It is believed that when the range of severity, likeli-
hood and detection is from 1 to 10 a risk with its RPN 
≥100 is a high risk failure and if the severity is more 
than 5, then modifying the design work is essential [ 3]. 
According to this conception, 9 failure modes had se-
verity numbers higher than 5 but only 3 of them had a  
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Fig. 1. Unacceptable failure modes (RPN>80) 
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Fig. 2. Failures which require redesigning (SV>5) 
RPN of higher than 100. Systems with RPN>100 need 
to be redesigned (Fig. 2).  
The accidents occurred in next two years were 
tracked. The results revealed that, modification of the 
process and equipment reduced the accidents signifi-
cantly. Three TBM stops due to bad rock condition were 
the major accidents occurred during next two years. The 
consequences of these accidents were negligible. The 
comparison of the accidents (numbers and conse-
quences) with similar projects shows that this project 
was successful in accident prevention. 
Electric system. Power generator, short circuit in 
secondary windings of the transformer, high voltage 
drop along the power distribution line or getting high 
current from the system may lead to a low output volt-
age.  
This failure can effect electric consuming subsys-
tems or burn the transformer and finally stop the TBM. 
It can be prevented or discovered through applying volt-
age control relays, breakers sensitive to voltage in main 
circuit breakers, and phase controlling relays. The re-
lated expertise team suggested applying Programmable 
Logic Circuit (PLC) for design modification and con-
trolling this failure mode. The application of PLC will 
reduce the detection number from 3 to 2. This will re-
duce the RPN from 90 to an acceptable level of 60 (Fig. 
1). The application of this controlling measure will not 
influence the severity and likely hood numbers.   
Hydraulic System. According to the results, in 
TBM Hydraulic system, all failure modes except the 
starting defect of pressure supplier (RPN=96) were low 
risk failure modes. The high likelihood number of this 
failure means that the probability of its occurrence is 
relatively high. This failure mode that can stop the TBM 
may be caused mainly due to defective electromotor, 
defective circulation pump problems in main circuit or 
lose fittings. The related expertise team recommended 
an appropriate preventive maintenance program in order 
to control this failure. The application of an appropriate 
preventive maintenance is expected to reduce the likeli-
hood number from 8 to 5 and the RPN from 96 to 40.  
Pneumatic System. The results reveal that, con-
sidering Risk Priority Numbers, defective opening of 
high pressure tank is the only high risk failure mode in 
the pneumatic system. Corrosion, humidity and any 
obstacle in the tap may lead to this failure. The failure 
will increase the pressure of the tank and burst it which 
will finally stop the TBM. At present, the pressure 
gauges on air tanks and in TBM control rooms are used 
to detect this failure.  
The MFMEA expertise team recommended preven-
tive maintenance, periodical checks, and punctual re-
placement of the appropriate parts to control this failure. 
The application of these recommendations is expected 
to reduce the RPN of this failure mode from 108 to 54. 
The control actions will not reduce the severity number. 
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A modification design for the opening mechanism of the 
high pressure tank is required to reduce severity num-
ber. 
The results also show that in the TBM pneumatic 
system 3 failure modes had severity numbers higher 
than 5. They included electric coil breakdown, starting 
defect of air supplier and opening defect of pressure 
tank. If the electric coil of air supplier breaks down, it 
will not have any local effects but it will stop the com-
pressor which will consequently stop the TBM. At pre-
sent, PLC is applied to detect this failure. The expertise 
team believed that an appropriate preventive mainte-
nance program will reduce its likelihood and detection 
numbers leading to a reduction of RPN from 56 to 14. 
The control actions will not reduce the severity number, 
thus modification of electric coil design seems to be 
essential.  
Starting defect in air supplier will not have a local 
effect, but it will stop the compressor which will conse-
quently stop the TBM. Any defects in PLC, burning of 
contactor blades, sulfating, dust and any electrical or 
mechanical failures in electromotor may lead to this 
failure mode. Presently, PLC is used to detect this fail-
ure. Preventive maintenance is suggested to reduce RPN 
from 54 to 24, but it will not reduce the severity num-
ber. A modification of starting design is recommended 
to reduce severity number. 
Mechanical System. Cutter head stop is the most 
severe and highly risk failure mode in this system. High 
severity and likelihood numbers are the special charac-
teristics of this failure mode. This failure leads to stop 
the TBM. 
Bad rock condition is the main reason the cutter 
head stops. Core drilling is recommended to identify 
rock condition in advance. This will reduce the likeli-
hood number from 8 to 6 and the detection number from 
3 to 2 which all together will reduce the RPN from 240 
to 120. This suggestion was applied and reduced the 
cutter head stop due to rock condition from then on.  
Cutter disc wear is the next failure mode with a high 
RPN and severity number. It may lead to TBM stop. 
Bad Rock condition and non-standard disc material are 
the main reasons for this failure. The expertise team 
recommended using standard discs and periodical 
checks to prevent this failure. These actions will reduce 
the likelihood number from 4 to 2 and the detection 
number from 7 to 5 which will totally reduce the RPN 
from 168 to 60. 
The third failure mode with a RPN higher than 80 is 
scraper defect (break down and wear). This failure 
mode will stop the TBM. This failure has a relatively 
high detection number. Thus periodical checks may help 
to detect it easier. The team did not make any recom-
mendations.  
CONCLUSION   
MFMEA is a superb analyzing tool to evaluate the 
reliability of a TBM. Prediction of the risk priority 
numbers considering the controlling measures applied to 
the system provides very useful guidelines for loss con-
trol due to accident prevention. 
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